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Abstract
An analysis of a recently proposed cryptosystem based on chaotic os-
cillators and feedback inversion is presented. It is shown how the cryp-
tosystem can be broken when Duffing’s oscillator is considered. Some
implementation problems of the system are also discussed.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been
proposed [1], many of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness and
security. In the Letter [2], the authors have proposed a symmetric cryptosystem
based on chaotic oscillators. More precisely, let N : L∞e (R+)→ L∞e (R+) be a
non-linear time-varying system, where L∞e (R+) stands for the extended L∞-
space on R+, and let S1 and S2 be two signal generators which generate the
time functions t 7→ w1(t) and t 7→ w2(t), respectively. The encryption process is
defined by adding the signal generator S2 to the output of the dynamic evolution
of N . Explicitly, to encrypt a message defined by a train of pulses t 7→ p(t), of
suitable width and of amplitude zero or one, is necessary to compute the function
u(t) = p(t)+w1(t), ∀t ≥ 0. Then, u(t) is applied to the system N and its output
is added to w2(t). The ciphertext is then defined to be c(t) = (Nu)(t) + w2(t),
∀t ≥ 0.
The decryption process consists of the two signal generators, S1 and S2,
and a feedback system S(g,N), where N is the non-linear system used in the
encryption protocol and g is the gain of the system. To decrypt a message c(t),
one subtracts w2(t) from c(t) and the result is the input to the system S(g,N).
Its output, u˜(t), is a good, but noisy, approximation of u(t); also, the difference
between w1(t) and u˜(t) gives p˜(t), which is a good, but noisy, approximation
of p(t). Using a low-pass filter L(s) and a quantizer Q, the original message
is obtained. In order to recover the original message exactly, L(s) should be
designed carefully. Although the authors seem to base the security of their
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cryptosystem on the chaotic behavior of the output of the non-linear system N ,
no analysis of security is included.
In the present Letter we discuss the weaknesses of this system in Section 2
and we analyze its practical implementation in Section 3.
2 Attacks to the cryptosystem
In this section we show how to break the cryptosystem proposed in [2] when
Duffing’s oscillator is used as the non-linear time-varying system [2, §3.1], which,
in fact, is the first example explained in detail. The main problem with this cryp-
tosystem lies on the fact that the ciphertext is an analog signal, whose waveform
depends on the system parameter values and the plaintext signal. Likewise, the
detected signal before the quantizer depends on these same parameters. The
study of these signals provides the necessary information to recover a good es-
timation of the system parameter values and the correct plaintext.
We consider the first example in [2, §4.1], for Duffing’s oscillator, represented
by:
N : x¨(t) + δx˙(t)− αx(t) + βx(t)3 = u(t), x(0) = 0, x˙(0) = 0. (1)
In their example w1(t) = A cosωt and w2(t) ≡ 0. The key of the system is made
by the oscillator’s parameters (δ, α, β), and the signal generator’s parameters
(A,ω). Following the example given, we use a key formed by the following set
of parameters:
α = 10, β = 100, δ = 1, A = 1.5, ω = 3.76. (2)
Duffing’s oscillator is used operating in the chaotic region. This region is roughly
characterized by the following values of the parameters:
3 ≤ α ≤ 15, 40 ≤ β ≤ 250, 0.5 ≤ δ ≤ 1.7, 1 ≤ A ≤ 2, 0.5 ≤ ω ≤ 7. (3)
The sensitivity to the parameter values is so low that the original plaintext can
be recovered from the ciphertext using a receiver system with parameter values
considerably different from the ones used by the sender. As a consequence, it
is very economic to try different combinations of the parameters until a reason-
able approximation is reached. Although the parameter values can be obtained
with a very accurate precision, their knowledge is not necessary to recover the
plaintext.
We have found that the message can be decrypted even when β has an error
of ±5%; δ has an error from −30% to +60% and α has an absolute error of ±2
integers; with respect to the original set of parameters (2).
In Fig. 1 we show the power spectral analysis of the example ciphertext
signal. As is observed, the frequency of the forced oscillator is totally evident.
The spectrum highest peak appears at the S1 signal generator frequency of
ω = 3.76. Thus, by simply examining the ciphertext, one of the elements of the
key (ω) is obtained.
Next, the attacker uses a receiver for which A = 0, and the rest of the
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parameters takes values from the following sets:
α = {5, 9, 13}, (4)
β = {43, 47, 51, 56, 62, 68, 75, 82, 91, 100, 110,
120, 130, 145, 160, 180, 200, 220, 240}, (5)
δ = {0.7, 1.3}. (6)
This makes a total of 114 possible combinations, which should be tried one by
one. To check whether the choice of the parameters is good, we look at the
output of the low-pass filter L(s), which we call pˆ(t). When the parameter
values are slightly different from the right ones, then pˆ(t) will look like a square
signal summed with a pure sine. The frequency of this sine corresponds to
the value of ω previously calculated from the spectrum of the ciphertext. The
amplitude of this sine corresponds exactly to the value of A used by the sender.
Next, the value of A just computed is used to regenerate the plaintext. Due
to the low sensitivity to the parameter values, although the exact values are
unknown, the deciphered plaintext signal will be equal (or very close) to the
original one. In Fig. 2 the recovered plaintext is depicted for the following
parameter values:
α = 9, β = 100, δ = 0.7, A = 1.4, ω = 3.76. (7)
The first three values are taken from the equations (4)–(6). Although the pa-
rameter errors are 10%, 0%, 30%, 6.66%, and 0%, respectively, the plaintext is
correctly recovered. These values could be further refined by varying them in
an effort to approximate pˆ(t) to a square wave.
3 Difficulties of practical implementation
In this section we discuss the difficulties that this cryptosystem will face if it is
practically implemented.
3.1 Analog transmission
The proposed cryptosystem seems to present serious problems in a real trans-
mission, because the recovered signal at the receiving end of the transmission
path will be very difficult to decrypt.
Apparently, the authors have only implemented a software simulation of
the complete encryption/decryption system, feeding the ciphertext (the output
generated by the encryption system) directly as the input to the decryption
system. The generators S1 and S2, part of the system key, look to be connected
simultaneously and locally to both the encryption and decryption systems.
In real world applications, however, things happen in a very different way.
Ideal transmission lines introduce an unknown amount of attenuation and de-
lay in the transmitted signal. Furthermore, real transmission lines introduce
distortion and noise too. Moreover, wireless communication systems exhibit
time-variable attenuation and delay.
Thus, the input signal at the receiver end c′(t) and the transmitted signal
c(t) will differ. In the most favorable case, if we assume that we are using an
ideal line, the received signal will be c′(t) = kc(t + τ), were k and τ are the
attenuation and delay of the line.
3
3.1.1 Synchronization
As the authors point out, most continuous chaotic cryptosystems described un-
til now are based on the synchronization of two chaotic systems. The claimed
novelty of the present cryptosystem relies on the lack of synchronization be-
tween encryption and decryption; but this is an erroneous claim, because in the
software simulations the authors have used a hidden synchronization mechanism
consisting of the local and simultaneous connection of generators S1 and S2 to
both the encryption and decryption systems.
In real world applications, given that transmission lines have limited band-
width, when transmitting to a remote system, signal delay will take place. The
delay amount may vary for different frequency components of the signal, depend-
ing on the line impulsive response. Thus, the observed waveforms at sender and
receiver ends may differ and it will be very difficult to estimate the right moment
to start the receiving generators.
Some measures should be taken to assure that both ends are using signal
generators S1 and S2 with exactly the same phase in respect to the ciphertext.
However, no mesure is considered by the authors. Hence the receiver end’s
generators will never generate the adequate signal.
3.1.2 Attenuation
Another factor to be considered is the line attenuation. No continuous trans-
mission or storage system (cable, optical, magnetic or wireless) grants that the
received or reproduced signal amplitude preserves the original amplitude. If
the signal is transmitted over a switched network, the attenuation will change
each time that a new connection is made. If the signal is transmitted over a
wireless channel, the attenuation will vary depending on changing atmospheric
conditions, changing reflections, and changing multipath.
When transmitting a signal of known constant amplitude (e.g. square pulses
or frequency modulated sinusoids) it is possible to equalize the received signal,
restoring the correct amplitude level. But in the present case, as the signal is
chaotic, its amplitude is varying in an unpredictable fashion, so it is impossible
any level restoring.
Therefore, it will be impossible to subtract exactly w2 at the receiver end.
Hence, the signal r at the input of the decryption system feedback loop will be
r(t) = c′(t)− w2(t), i.e.:
r(t) = k(Nu)(t+ ǫ) + kw2(t+ ǫ)− w2(t), (8)
where ǫ is the time inaccuracy in the determination of the right moment to start
the receiving generators. Hence, the decrypted signal will be:
y(t) ≈ (N−1r)(t) = (N−1(k(Nu)(t+ ǫ) + kw2(t+ ǫ)− w2(t)))(t). (9)
As N is a nonlinear chaotic map and due to the sensitive dependence on the
initial conditions that characterize chaos [3, p. 119], the decrypted signal y(t)
will never match the plaintext p(t).
The recovered plaintext errors induced by the use of a real communication
channel with restricted bandwidth, attenuation and/or noise are illustrated in
Fig. 3.
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Moreover, the authors seem to base the security of their cryptosystem on
the chaotic behavior of N , although no evidence of that is shown. In any case,
the chaotic profile of the output x(t) in Duffing’s oscillator (1) is not always
guaranteed for every input u(t) = p(t) + w1(t), even in the chaotic range (3),
and the sensitive dependence on the initial conditions is diminished as they are
kept to be fixed, x(0) = 0, x˙(o) = 0, in Duffing’s equation (1).
3.2 Digital transmission
If a discretization of the ciphertext is sent instead of the dynamic evolution of
the system N , then there are two options.
In the first one, the ciphertext is discretized only at the nodes i = 0, . . . , n,
where n is the number of pulses of p(t). Then, the ciphertext sent by the sender
must be the 3-uples (x(ti), x˙(ti), x¨(ti)), i = 0, . . . , n, since the receiver needs
to know these values—and not only the x(ti)—in order to be able to decrypt
the message, as the usual methods of discretization do not allow to obtain the
values of the derivative at the nodes ti in terms of the values of the function at
such nodes. For example, if one uses the Runge-Kutta method (see [4, §163])
to solve x¨ = f (t, x, x˙), then the values of the first derivative are given by
x˙(t0 + h) = x˙(t0) +
1
6
(k1 + 2k2 + 2k3 + k4) , (10)
k1 = hf (t0, x (t0) , x˙ (t0)) , (11)
k2 = hf
(
t0 +
1
2
h, x(t0) +
1
2
hx˙(t0) +
1
8
hk1, x˙(t0) +
1
2
k1
)
, (12)
k3 = hf
(
t0 +
1
2
h, x(t0) +
1
2
hx˙(t0) +
1
8
hk2, x˙(t0) +
1
2
k2
)
, (13)
k4 = hf
(
t0 + h, x(t0) + hx˙(t0) +
1
2
hk3, x˙(t0) + k3
)
. (14)
We remark on the fact that the values for the second derivative should be
computed from the formula
x¨(ti) = f (ti, x(ti), x˙(ti)) , (15)
where f is the function defining the dynamic system N . This fact implies
that the transmission has a high factor expansion as every pulse of the original
message is transmitted by means of a 3-uple of real numbers with a consistent
number of decimals.
The second option consists in computing a much more long list of values
x(si), i = 0, . . . ,m, with m≫ n. In this case, the values for the first derivative
can be obtained from the formulas above; but the second derivative should
also be included in the transmission. Hence, in this case the ciphertext is
(x(si), x¨(si)), i = 0, . . . ,m. What is gained in not sending the first derivative is
lost by the greater number of entries of the list.
In any case, the values of the first and second derivatives cannot be computed
by the usual approximate formulas
x˙(ti) ≈
x(ti+1)− x(ti)
h
, (16)
x¨(ti) ≈
x(ti+2)− 2x(ti+1) + x(ti)
h2
, (17)
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as they produce considerable errors in the decryption process due to the non-
linear terms in N .
4 Conclusion
As a consequence of the previous analysis, the cryptosystem studied cannot work
in practice because it is not using any synchronization mechanism and because
it is not robust to real channel conditions. On the other hand, the cryptosystem
is rather weak, since it can be broken by using a set of 114 parameter values
only. The total lack of security, along with the lack of robustness, discourages
the use of this algorithm for secure applications.
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Figure captions
Figure 1: Power spectral analysis of the ciphertext signal. The highest peak
corresponds to the frequency of S1 and lies at ω ≈ 3.76.
Figure 2: Plaintext recovery with inexact receiver parameter values. Time
histories of: (a) plaintext; (b) recovered plaintext; (c) pˆ(t).
Figure 3: Effects of a real communication channel: (a) plaintext; (b) recovered
plaintext with channel bandwidth restricted to ω = 6.28 rad/seg; (c) recovered
plaintext with channel attenuation of 3 dB; (d) recovered plaintext with channel
noise of −40 dB; (e) recovered plaintext with channel bandwidth restricted to
ω = 9.42 rad/seg, attenuation of 0.5 dB and noise of −50 dB. The parameter
values at the sender and receiver ends match exactly.
